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The doctrine of respondeat superior applied to this case is founded
on considerations of public policy. The rationale is that one who volun-
tarily substitutes another in his place to act for him should be responsible
for those acts, which, had there been no substitution, would have been
his own acts, or would not have occurred. Higbee Co. v. Jackson, IOI
Ohio St. 75, 128 N.E. 61, 14 A.L.R. i3i (1920). The defendant,
as an individual, could not possibly conduct his business single handed.
The nature of his enterprise required concerted action by several drivers.
Under modern conditions it seems more in accord with economic actual-
ities to say that one who desires the profits incidental to conducting busi-
ness by representatives should bear the responsibility for the acts of those
representatives.
WARREN RICHMOND.
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT - PRINCIPLE'S LIABILITY FOR NEG-
LIGENCE OF COMMISSION SALESMAN.
The driver of an automobile was employed by the defendant as
salesman for new and used cars. He was to report each day at 8:30 a. m.
and was to be paid on a commission basis. The salesman could use his
own judgment as to approaching prospective customers. He was to
have one hour for lunch and was permitted to go where he wished for it.
On the day in question the driver went home for lunch and the em-
ployer, defendant, furnished him an automobile for that purpose. While
the employee was returning in order to demonstrate an automobile to
a customer he injured the plaintiff. The lower court held for the plain-
tiff upon a general verdict. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for Hamilton County. The reasoning of this court was that since the
employee was to return to the salesroom to secure a demonstrator, and
then go to the customer and demonstrate the car, this was in itself con-
trolling as indicating that the employee was in the scope of his employ-
ment. In this case the court emphasized the element of control. The
E. S. Gahagen Co. v. Smith, 48 Ohio App. 290, I Ohio Op. 430, 194
N.E. 26, I8 Abs. 366 (1934).
It is well established that the employer is liable to third persons for
acts of his agent when done in the scope of his employment. Henshaw
v. Noble, 7 Ohio St. 226 (857); Clark v. Frey, 8 Ohio St. 358, 72
Am. Dec., 590 (1858); Pickens v. Diecher, 21 Ohio St. 212 (871);
Passenger R. Co. v. Young, 21 Ohio St. 518 (1871).
The principle question arising in all of these cases is whether the
employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of
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the injury. Many courts place the emphasis on the control which the
employer exercises over his employee. Clark v. Frey, supra; Higbee Co.
v. Jackson, ioi Ohio St. 75, 14 A.L.R. 131, 128 N.E. 6i, 2o NCCA
144 (1920); Curran v. Earl C. Anthony, 77 Cal. App. 462, 247 P-
236 (1925); Aisenberg v. Adams Co., 95 Conn. 419, iii A. 59i
(1920); Mitchell's Case, 121 Me., 455, ii8 A. 287, 33 A.L.R. 1447
(1922); Messmer v. Bell and Coggeshall Co., i33 Ky. 19, 117 S.W.
346 (i909). In Root v. Shadbolt and Middleton, 195 Iowa 1225,
193 NAV. 634 (1923) the court held that the test of the power to
control was in itself conclusive. Some courts make a distinction between
general control and control of details, holding that only in the latter
instance is the employee acting in the scope of employment. Barton v.
Studebaker, 46 Cal. App. 707, 189 P. 1025 (1920); Page v. Affa-
noose County, 184 Iowa 498, 168 N.W. 916 (1918); Gay v. Rail-
road, 148 N.C. 336, 62 S.E. 436 (i9o8); Boyd v. Mahone, 142 Va.
690, 128 S.E. 259, 262 (1925); Restatement of Agency, Vol. i,
Sec. 14; Mechem on Agency, Vol. 2, Sec. 1863, 2nd Ed.; See also
14 R.C.L. 67 for a list of cases emphasing and applying the control test.
Other courts inquire into the motive of the employee to see whether the
motive for the furtherance of the employer's business dominates over his
personal motive. Railway Co. v. Little, 67 Ohio St. 9 I , 65 N.E. 861
(i9o2); The Nelson Business College Co. v. Lyod, 6o Ohio St. 448,
54 N.E. 471 (1899); Riley v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 231 N.Y.
301, 132 N.E. 97 (1921); McCarthy v. Timmins, 178 Mass. 378,
59 N.E. 1038 86 Ann St. Rep. 490 (i9oo); Restatement of Agency,
Sec. 236. A third point of emphasis employed by some courts is that of
space. When the employee deviates from his regular route, the courts
vary as to the place or zone within which the employee can be said to be
in the scope of his employment. Stewart v. Whitford, 22 C.C. (N.S.)
585, 30 C.D. 65 2-C.J.N. (915); Railway Express Agency v. Lewis,
i56 Va. 8oo, 159 S.E. 188 (1931); Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor
Car Co., 231 N.Y. 273, 131 N.E. 914 (192 1); Hartnett v. Gryzmish,
218 Mass. 258, 105 N.E. 988 (1914); Restatement of Agency, Sec.
237. And finally when a chattel is involved some courts attach signifi-
cance to ownership, as to whether the employer or employee owns the
chattel. The White Oak Coal Co. v. Rivow, 88 Ohio St. 18, io2
N.E. 302 (1913). Usually, if the employer gives his consent for the
use of the automobile and the employee is using it for his own use the
owner is liable. However, if no consent is given and the employee uses
it for his own use the employer is not liable because the employee is con-
sidered without the scope of employment. 22 A.L.R. 1397; 45 A.L.R.
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477; 50 A.L.R. 1450. It will be noted that the emphasis in the prin-
ciple case was placed upon the control element.
NOAH J. KERN
Appeal and Error
MOTION TO CERTIFY - EFFECT OF OVERRULING MOTION
STARE DECIsIs.
"The refusal of a motion to certify, even if the same legal question
is decisively involved, does not furnish an adjudication of the question by
this court as an established precedent for future cases." This unequivocal
language was used by the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio in the
recent case of Village of Brewster v. Hill. The circumstances of the
controversy calling forth this statement were that the capacity of a town
to contract under Article VIII, section 6 of the Ohio Constitution was
challenged by Hill, a taxpayer. The case of Nicol v. Tolhurst, Village
of ilmherst (unreported), decided by the Court of Appeals of Lorain
County in a pro forma opinion, was similar factually, and that court had
decided in favor of the Village. Counsel for the Village of Brewster
cited the Amherst case as authority for his position, since a motion to
certify had been overruled by the Supreme Court. The Court, however,
held in favor of Hill and against the Village. We may take it, then, as
an indisputable fact that overruling a motion to certify is not an affirm-
ance. Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 343, 19o N.E. 766,
40 O.L.B. 66 (i934).
At first blush, it would seem that this situation is highly contradic-
tory; two cases similar factually, yet having two opposing decisions upon
the question involved. In fact, however, there is no ambiguity. In ref-
erence to the law of Ohio generally, the Supreme Court has spoken, and
their word is the law. It would be well, however, for the lawyer to
keep the Amherst case in mind when before the Court of Appeals of
Lorain County.
A further instance of this principle is found in the words of Judge
Jones in The Cleveland Railroad Co. v. Masterson, 126 Ohio St. 42,
183 N.E. 873, 37 O.L.R. 337, 42 A.L.R. 15 (1932). "Various cases
involving the application of the 'last clear chance' rule have, from time
to time, appeared on the motion docket of the court, and in such cases
this court has generally given its sanction to the rule in Erie Railroad
Co. v. McCormdck, A4dm'x, 69 Ohio St. 45. A recent case knocking
at our doors for certification was Ross v. Hocking Valley Railroad Co.,
2.8o LAW J0URNAL-MAY2 1935
